The following research materials may be of help to bloggers.  This page will be periodically updated as new jurisprudence come out.

Here are some updates researched by former Provincial Prosecutor Roger C. Hipol of La Union..

People vs. Casta, G.R. No. 172871, September 16, 2008

As a rule, the prosecution bears the burden of establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. However, when the accused admits the killing and, by way of justification, pleads self-defense, the burden of evidence shifts; he must then show by clear and convincing evidence that he indeed acted in self-defense. For that purpose, he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution’s case (See People v. Santillana, G.R. No. 127815, June 9, 1999, 308 SCRA 104).

Article 11(1) of the Revised Penal Code spells out the elements that the accused must establish by clear and convincing evidence to successfully plead self-defense.  The Article provides:

Art. 11. Justifying Circumstances. – The following do not incur any criminal liability:

1.            Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur:

First. Unlawful aggression;

Second. Reasonable necessity of the means to prevent or repel it;

Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

x x x

               There is unlawful aggression when the peril to one’s life, limb or right is either actual or imminent.  There must be actual physical force or actual use of a weapon. It is a statutory and doctrinal requirement to establish self-defense that unlawful aggression must be present.  It is a condition sine qua non; there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, unless the victim commits unlawful aggression against the person defending himself (People v. Ansowas, G.R. No. 140647, December 18, 2002, 394 SCRA 227).

oOo

Treachery, the qualifying circumstance alleged against the appellant, exists when an offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms which tend directly or especially to ensure its execution, without risk to the offender, arising from the defense that the offended party might make           (People v. Batin, G.R. No. 177223, November 28, 2007, 539 SCRA 272, 288).  This definition sets out what must be shown by evidence to conclude that treachery existed, namely: (1) the employment of such means of execution as would give the person attacked no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; and (2) the deliberate and conscious adoption of the means of execution. To reiterate, the essence of qualifying circumstance is the suddenness, surprise and the lack of expectation that the attack will take place, thus depriving the victim of any real opportunity for self-defense while ensuring the commission of the crime without risk to the aggressor (People v. Felipe, G.R. No. 142505, December 11, 2003, 418 SCRA 146).

oOo

Voluntary surrender, properly undertaken, is a mitigating circumstance that lowers the imposable penalty.  It is present when the following elements concur: a) the offender has not been actually arrested; b) the offender surrenders himself to a person in authority or to the latter’s agent; and c) the surrender is voluntary. To be sufficient, the surrender must be spontaneous and made in a manner clearly indicating the intent of the accused to surrender unconditionally, either because he acknowledges his guilt or wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense attendant to the efforts of searching for and capturing him (Ladiana v. People, G.R. No. 144293, December 4, 2002, 393 SCRA 419).

That the appellant surrendered only in the morning of August 21, 1989 (or a day after the stabbing incident) does not diminish nor affect the voluntariness of his surrender.  For voluntary surrender to mitigate an offense, it is not required that the accused surrender at the first opportunity (People v. Saul, G.R. No. 124809,  December 19, 2001, 372 SCRA 637).  Here, the appellant went voluntarily went with SPO1 Camba to the police station within a day after the killing to own up to the killing.  Thus, the police did not devote time and effort to the investigation of the killing and to the search and capture of the assailant.

Based on these considerations, we hold that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be appreciated in appellant’s favor.

People vs. Dumangay, G.R. No. 173483, September 23, 2008

The elements of illegal sale of shabu are: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.  What is material is the proof that the transaction or sale transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti.  Corpus delicti is the body or substance of the crime, and establishes the fact that a crime has been actually committed.  It has two elements, namely: (1) proof of the occurrence of a certain event; and (2) some person’s criminal responsibility for the act (People v. Del Mundo, G.R. No. 169141, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 554, 562, citing People v. Isnani, G.R. No. 133006, June 9, 2004, 431 SCRA 439, 449 and People v. Monte, G.R. No. 144317, August 5, 2003, 408 SCRA 305, 309-310).

oOo

A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment legally employed by peace officers as an effective way of apprehending drug dealers in the act of committing an offense. Such police operation has judicial sanction as long as it is carried out with due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards (People v. Chua, G.R. No. 133789, August 23, 2001, 363 SCRA 562, 583).  The delivery of the contraband to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked money successfully consummate the buy-bust transaction between the entrapping officers and the accused.  Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their duty, their testimony on the operation deserves faith and credit (People v. Del Mundo, supra, at 565-566).

oOo

In light of the clear and convincing evidence of the prosecution, we find no reason to deviate from the findings of the trial court and the appellate court.  More so, appellant failed to present evidence that Barbosa and the other members of the team had any ill motive to falsely accuse her of a serious crime.  Absent any proof of such motive, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty as well as the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses shall prevail over appellant’s self-serving and uncorroborated defenses (People v. Isnani, supra note 20 at 455).

People vs. Gaffud, Jr., G.R. No. 168050, September 19, 2008, en banc

               In a complex crime, although two or more crimes are actually committed, they constitute only one crime in the eyes of the law as well as in the conscience of the offender.  Hence, there is only one penalty imposed for the commission of a complex crime [citing Luis B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Revised Fifteenth Edition, Book One, 650 (2001) citing People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515].

There are two kinds of complex crime.  The first is known as compound crime, or when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies.  The second is known as complex crime proper, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other (Id.)

The classic example of the first of kind is when a single bullet results in the death of two or more persons.  A different rule governs where separate and distinct acts result in a number killed.  Deeply rooted is the doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes [People v. Hon. Pineda et al., 127 Phil. 150 (1967)].    

In the landmark case People v. Guillen  [85 Phil. 307, 318 (1950)] the Court held that the single act of throwing a grenade at President Roxas resulting in the death of another person and injuring four others produced the complex crime of murder and multiple attempted murders  x x x  .

More recently, in People v. Carpo et al. (G.R. No. 132676, April 4, 2001, 356 SCRA 248), we held that the single act of hurling a grenade into the bedroom of the victims causing the death of three persons and injuries to one person constituted the complex crime of multiple murder and attempted murder.  Also, in People v. Comadre (G.R. No. 153559, June 8, 2004, 431 SCRA 366, 384), we held:

The underlying philosophy of complex crimes in the Revised Penal Code, which follows the pro reo principle, is intended to favor the accused by imposing a single penalty irrespective of the crimes committed. The rationale being, that the accused who commits two crimes with single criminal impulse demonstrates lesser perversity than when the crimes are committed by different acts and several criminal resolutions.

The single act by appellant of detonating a hand grenade may quantitatively constitute a cluster of several separate and distinct offenses, yet these component criminal offenses should be considered only as a single crime in law on which a single penalty is imposed because the offender was impelled by a “single criminal impulse” which shows his lesser degree of perversity.

In light of these precedents, we hold that the single act of accused-appellant — burning the house of Manuel Salvador, with the main objective of killing the latter and his daughter, Analyn Salvador, resulting in their deaths — resulted in the complex crime of double murder. 

oOo

By and of itself, nighttime is not an aggravating circumstance. It becomes aggravating only when: (1) it is especially sought by the offender; or (2) it is taken advantage of by him; or (3) it facilitates the commission of the crime by ensuring the offender’s immunity from capture [People v. Silva et al., 435 Phil. 779 (2002)].  In this case, the RTC correctly appreciated nighttime as aggravating considering that nighttime was especially sought by accused-appellant to carry out his evil plan. Evidence shows that accused-appellant waited for nighttime to consummate his plan.  It should be noted that accused-appellant was seen lurking near the house of the victims earlier in the evening.  The fact that he brought with him a flashlight clearly shows that he intended to commit the crime in darkness.

People vs. Martin, et al., G.R. No. 177571, September 29, 2008

People vs. Mateo, G.R. No. 170569, September 30, 2008

 Physical resistance is not an essential element of the felony, and need not be established when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and the latter submits herself, against her will, to the rapist’s embrace because of fear for her life and personal safety [People v. Alberio, G.R. No. 152584, July 6, 2004, 433 SCRA 469, 475 citing People v. Rebose, 367 Phil. 768 (1999)].  It is enough that the malefactor intimidated the complainant into submission.  Failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance did not make voluntary the complainant’s submission to the criminal acts of the accused  [Id. citing People v. Corea, 336 Phil. 72 (1997)].  Furthermore, not every victim of rape can be expected to act with reason or in conformity with the usual expectations of everyone (Id., citing People v. Cabel, G.R. No. 121508, December 14, 1995, 282 SCRA 410).  The workings of a human mind placed under emotional stress are unpredictable; people react differently.  Some may shout, some may faint, while others may be shocked into insensibility [Id., citing People v. Malunes, 317 Phil. 378 (1995)].  Also, the inequality of their physical strength made any resistance on AAA’s part futile (People v. Pulanco, G.R. No. 141186, November 27, 2003, 416 SCRA 532, 540 citing People v.  Ferrer, G.R. Nos. 116516-20, September 7, 1998, 295 SCRA 190

oOo

                    The fact that there was no weapon used by the accused does not rule out force in the rape committed (People v. Marabillas, G.R. No. 127494, February 18, 1999, 303 SCRA 352, 359 citing People v. Domingo, G.R. No. 97921, September 8, 1993, 226 SCRA 156).   It is a settled rule that the force contemplated by law in the commission of rape is relative, depending on the age, size and strength of the parties (People v. Moreno, G.R. No. 126921, August 28, 1998, 294 SCRA 728, 739).   It is not necessary that the force and intimidation employed in accomplishing it be so great and of such character as could not be resisted; it is only necessary that the force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind  (Id., citing People v. Antonio, G.R. No. 107950, June 17, 1994, 233 SCRA 283).

oOo

                    It is settled that sexual intercourse with a woman who is a mental retardate constitutes statutory rape, which does not require proof that the accused used force or intimidation in having carnal knowledge of the victim for conviction. (People v. Jackson, G.R. No. 131842, June 10, 2003, 403 SCRA 500,516 citing People v. Lopez, G.R. No. 135671, November 29, 2000, 346 SCRA 469, 474; People v. Padilla, supra).  However, this fact was not alleged in the complaint filed in this case and therefore cannot be the basis for conviction (People v. Capinpin, G.R. No. 118608, October 30, 2000, 344 SCRA 420, 429).

People vs. Teczon, G.R. No. 174098, September 12, 2008

               Accused-appellant’s arguments deserve scant consideration. Infliction of physical injury is not an essential element of rape (People v. San Antonio, Jr., G.R. No. 176633, September 5, 2007, 532 SCRA 411, 429; People v. Sonido, G.R. No. 148815, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 689, 714; People v. Boromeo, G.R. No. 150501, June 3, 2004, 430 SCRA 533, 546).   Under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, the gravamen of rape is carnal knowledge of a woman through force, threat, or intimidation against her will or without her consent. What is imperative is that the element of force or intimidation be proven (People v. Baylen, G.R. No. 135242, April 19, 2002, 381 SCRA 395, 403; People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 132071, October 16, 2000, 343 SCRA 267, 275 and force need not always produce physical injuries (People v. Malones, G.R. Nos. 124388-90, March 11, 2004, 425 SCRA 318, 335). Notably, force, violence, or intimidation in rape is a relative term, depending on the age, size, strength, and relationship of the parties (San Antonio, Jr., supra at 428-429; People v. Barcena, G.R. No. 168737, February 16, 2006, 482 SCRA 543, 554; People v. Antonio, G.R. No. 157269, June 3, 2004, 430 SCRA 619, 625).

People vs. Tinsay, G.R. No. 167383, September 22, 2008, en banc

The Court is convinced of the veracity of AAA’s testimony that appellant had carnal knowledge of her.  Even if only a portion of appellant’s penis had entered the victim’s vagina, it is settled that it is enough that the penis reaches the pudendum, or at the very least, the labia.  The mere introduction of the penis into the aperture of the female organ, thereby touching the labia of the pudendum, already consummates the crime of rape (People v. Pangilinan, G.R. No. 171020, March 14, 2007, 518 SCRA 358, 386-387).

oOo

                    x x x   in Maglente  (                   People v. Pangilinan, G.R. No. 171020, March 14, 2007, 518 SCRA 358, 384-385), the Court reiterated the oft-repeated rule that the testimony of a young victim against her very own parent is accorded great weight and credence.  The Court elucidated thus:

                    When the offended party is a young and immature girl testifying against a parent, courts are inclined to lend credence to her version of what transpired.  Youth and immaturity are given full weight and credit.  Incestuous rape is not an ordinary crime that can be easily invented because of its heavy psychological toll.  It is unlikely that a young woman of tender years would be willing to concoct a story which would subject her to a lifetime of gossip and scandal among neighbors and friends and even condemn her father to death.

                    Undergoing all of the humiliating and invasive procedures for the case—the initial police interrogation, the medical examination, the formal charge, the public trial and the cross-examination—proves to be the litmus test for truth, especially when endured by a minor who gives her consistent and unwavering testimony on the details of her ordeal. (Emphasis supplied)

People vs. Ugos, G.R. No. 181633, September 12, 2008

Accused-appellant’s denial of the crime cannot prevail over the positive testimony of the victim.  As held in People v. Suarez, a rape victim’s straightforward and candid account, corroborated by the medical findings of the examining physician, is sufficient to convict the accused.[1][23] [1][23] G.R. Nos. 153573-76, April 15, 2005, 456 SCRA 333, 350  This conclusion becomes all the more firm where, as in this case, the child-victim takes the witness stand.  Previous decisions involving rape cases have shown us the high improbability that a girl of tender years would impute to any man a crime so serious as rape if what she claims is not true.[2][24] [1][24] People v. Arsayo, G.R. No. 166546, September 26, 2006, 503 SCRA 275, 287  Also, as correctly pointed out by the CA, corroboration of a child’s testimony is not even required under Sec. 22 of the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness, thus:

Corroboration shall not be required of a testimony of a child.  [The child’s] testimony, if credible by itself, shall be sufficient to support a finding of fact, conclusion, or judgment subject to the standard of proof required in criminal and non-criminal cases.

Accused-appellant’s suggestion that the charge against him could have been fabricated, an offshoot of the argument he had with AAA’s mother, has nothing to support itself. There is likewise nothing in the records indicating that the prosecution witnesses testified against accused-appellant out of malice.

A rape victim’s testimony as to who abused her is credible where she has absolutely no motive to incriminate and testify against the accused.[3][25] [1][25] People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 135022, July 11, 2002, 384 SCRA 375, 389 Categorical and positive identification of an accused, without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the matter, prevails over denial and alibi, which are negative and self-serving.^[4][26] [1][26] Suarez, supra at 349 We thus affirm the trial court’s appreciation of the testimonial evidence adduced.  It is basic that the trial court’s evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses should be accorded the highest respect as it has the best opportunity to observe directly the demeanor of witnesses on the stand and to establish whether they are telling the truth.[5][27]

Angeles vs. People, G.R. No. 172744, September 29, 2008

Cruz vs. People, G.R. No. 176504, September 3, 2008

The settled rule is that when an accused pleads to the charge, he is deemed to have waived the right to preliminary investigation and the right to question any irregularity that surrounds it [Kuizon v. Desierto, 406 Phil. 611, 630 (2001); Gonzales v. Court of Appeals, 343 Phil. 297, 304 (1997); People v. Baluran, 143 Phil. 36, 44 (1970]). 

oOo

Uy vs. People, G.R. No. 174899, September 11, 2008

               Petitioner argues that the appellate court erred in convicting him of estafa, punishable under Article 315, par. 2(a), instead of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law).  He claims that only the fourth element of the crime charged – damage – may have been established.

          Estafa, under Article 315, par. 2, of the Revised Penal Code, is committed by any person who defrauds another by using a fictitious name; or falsely pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by means of similar deceits executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of fraud (R.R. Paredes v. Calilung, G.R. No. 156055, 5 March 2007, 517 SCRA 369, 393). Under this class of estafa, the element of deceit is indispensable [People v. Billaber, 465 Phil. 726, 744 (2004)].

          The elements of Estafa by means of deceit as defined under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code are as follows: (1) there must be false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; (2) such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (3) the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means, that is, he must have been induced to part with his money or property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; and (4) as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage (Cosme, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 149753, 27 November 2006, 508 SCRA 190, 203-204).

oOo

               Fraud, in its general sense, is deemed to comprise anything calculated to deceive, including all acts, omissions and concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust or confidence justly reposed, resulting in damage to another; or by which another is unduly and unconscientiously taken advantage of another.  It is a generic term embracing all multifarious means which human ingenuity can device, and which are resorted to by one individual to secure an advantage over another by false suggestions or by suppression of truth; and includes all forms of surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling and any other unfair way by which another is cheated.  Deceit is a species of fraud (Sim, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159280, 18 May 2004, 428 SCRA 459, 468).  And deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations; or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed, which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it, to his legal injury.  The false pretense or fraudulent act must be committed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, it being essential that such false statement or representation constitutes the very cause or the only motive which induces the offended party to part with his money [Alcantara v. Court of Appeals, 462 Phil. 72, 89 (2003)].  In the absence of such requisite, any subsequent act of the accused, however fraudulent and suspicious it might appear, cannot serve as basis for prosecution for estafa under the said provision (Preferred Home Specialties, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 163593, 16 December 2005, 478 SCRA 387, 411-412).

oOo

Petitioner contends he was denied due process of law when he was convicted of estafa instead of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.  An examination of the private complainant’s demand letter, he said, indicates that the demand was for alleged violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.

We find his contention untenable. 

Under Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the prosecutor.  In the case before us, the prosecutor, after going over the complaint found probable cause to charge him with estafa.  This was the prosecutor’s prerogative, considering that he was the one who would prosecute the case.  The prosecuting attorney cannot be compelled to file a particular criminal information [People v. Pineda, 127 Phil. 150, 156-157 (1967)].  The fact that the demand letter may suggest a violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 cannot control his action as to what charge he will file, if he sees evidence showing probable cause to charge an accused for another crime.  It is the prosecutor’s assessment of the evidence before him which will prevail, and not what is contained in a demand letter.

oOo

A contract of adhesion is so-called because its terms are prepared by only one party, while the other party merely affixes his signature signifying his adhesion thereto [Ermitaño v. Court of Appeals, 365 Phil. 671, 678-679 (1999)].  A contract of adhesion is just as binding as ordinary contracts.  It is true that we have, on occasion, struck down such contracts as void when the weaker party is imposed upon in dealing with the dominant bargaining party and is reduced to the alternative of taking it or leaving it, completely deprived of the opportunity to bargain on equal footing. Nevertheless, contracts of adhesion are not invalid per se; they are not entirely prohibited. The one who adheres to the contract is in reality free to reject it entirely; if he adheres, he gives his consent [Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 364 Phil. 947, 953-954 (1999)].

oOo

x x x  the effectivity of the Usury Law has been suspended by Central Bank Circular No. 905, s. 1982 effective 1 January 1983 [Ruiz v. Court of Appeals, 449 Phil. 419, 434 (2003)].

Abay, et al. vs. People, G.R. No. 165896, September 19, 2008

Alibi

Worth stressing, this Court has consistently ruled that the defense of alibi must be received with suspicion and caution, not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable, but also because it can be easily fabricated (citing People v. Tuppal, G.R. Nos. 137982-85, January 13, 2003, 395 SCRA 72, 80). Alibi is a weak defense that becomes even weaker in the face of the positive identification of the accused. An alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the petitioners by credible witnesses who have no motive to testify falsely (citing Vergara v. People, G.R. No. 128720, January 23, 2002, 374 SCRA 313, 325).

oOo

Highway Robbery/Brigandage

Considering the testimonies of witnesses and the evidence presented by the parties, we are in agreement that the crime of Highway Robbery/Brigandage was duly proven in this case. As defined under Section 2(e) of Presidential Decree No. 532 (“Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974” effective August 8, 1974), Highway Robbery/Brigandage is the seizure of any person for ransom, extortion or other unlawful purposes, or the taking away of the property of another by means of violence against or intimidation of person or force upon things or other unlawful means, committed by any person on any Philippine highway. Also, as held in People v. Puno (G.R. No. 97471, February 17, 1993, 219 SCRA 85, 97)

In fine, the purpose of brigandage is, inter alia, indiscriminate highway robbery. If the purpose is only a particular robbery, the crime is only robbery, or robbery in band if there are at least four armed participants…

Further, that Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes as highway robbery or brigandage only acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against any person or persons on Philippine highways as defined therein, and not acts of robbery committed against only a predetermined or particular victim…[Emphasis supplied.]

The elements of the crime of Highway Robbery/Brigandage have been clearly established in this case. First, the prosecution evidence demonstrated with clarity that the petitioners’ group was organized for the purpose of committing robbery in a highway. Next, there is no predetermined victim. The Kapalaran bus was chosen indiscriminately by the accused upon reaching their agreed destination — Alabang, Muntinlupa.

Gomba vs. People, G.R. No. 150536, September 17, 2008

1. That money, goods, or other personal property be received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same;

2. That there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender, or denial on his part of such receipt;

3. That such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and

4. That there is a demand made by the offended party to the offender.

oOo

Misappropriation is defined as:

[A]n act of using or disposing of another’s property as if it were one’s own or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. To “misappropriate” a thing of value for one’s own use or benefit [includes] not only conversion to one’s personal advantage but also every attempt to dispose of the property of another without a right (citing Lee v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 157781, 11 April 2005, 455 SCRA 460, 468).

People vs. Agulay, G.R. No. 181747, September 26, 2008

In order to successfully prosecute an accused for illegal sale of drugs, the prosecution must be able to prove the following elements:

<!–[if !supportLists]–>(1) <!–[endif]–>identities of the buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration; and

<!–[if !supportLists]–>(2) <!–[endif]–>the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefore (citing People v. Lee Hoi Ming, 459 Phil. 187, 193 (2003).

oOo

A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which in recent years has been accepted as a valid and effective mode of apprehending drug pushers. In a buy-bust operation, the idea to commit a crime originates from the offender, without anybody inducing or prodding him to commit the offense [citing People v. Valencia, 439 Phil. 561, 574 (2002)]. If carried out with due regard for constitutional and legal safeguards, a buy-bust operation deserves judicial sanction [citing People v. Abbu, 317 Phil. 518, 525 (1995)].

oOo

There are eight (8) instances when a warrantless search and seizure is valid, to wit:

(1) consented searches; (2) as an incident to a lawful arrest; (3) searches of vessels and aircraft for violation of immigration, customs, and drug laws; (4) searches of moving vehicles; (5) searches of automobiles at borders or constructive borders; (6) where the prohibited articles are in “plain view;” (7) searches of buildings and premises to enforce fire, sanitary, and building regulations; and (8) “stop and frisk” operations.

oOo

The defense contends there is a clear doubt on whether the specimens examined by the chemist and eventually presented in court were the same specimens recovered from accused-appellant. The prosecution’s failure to submit in evidence the required physical inventory and photograph of the evidence confiscated pursuant to Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 will not discharge accused-appellant from his crime. Non-compliance with said section is not fatal and will not render an accused’s arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. In People v. Del Monte (G.R. No. 179940, 23 April 2008), this Court held that what is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. In the instant case, we find the integrity of the drugs seized intact, and there is no doubt that the three sachets of drugs seized from accused-appellant were the same ones examined for chemical analysis, and that the crystalline substance contained therein was later on determined to be positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu).

oOo

Accused-appellant’s allegation that he is a victim of a frame-up, which has been held as a shop-worn defense of those accused in drug-related cases, is viewed by the Court with disfavor. Like the defense of alibi, frame-up is an allegation that can easily be concocted [citing People v. De Leon, 440 Phil. 368, 388 (2002)]; People v. Lee Hoi Ming, supra, at 195). For this claim to prosper, the defense must adduce clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption of regularity of official acts of government officials [citing People v. De Leon, id.; People v. Zheng Bai Hui, 393 Phil. 68, 135 (2000), People v. Boco, 368 Phil. 341, 366-367 (1999); Teodosio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124346, 8 June 2004, 431 SCRA 194, 204]. Absent any proof of motive to falsely accuse him of such a grave offense, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and the findings of the trial court with respect to the credibility of witnesses shall prevail over that of the accused-appellant (citing People v. Bongalon, 425 Phil. 96, 116 (2002).

oOo

In almost every case involving a buy-bust operation, the accused put up the defense of frame-up. Such claim is viewed with disfavor, because it can easily be feigned and fabricated. In People v. Uy, the Court reiterated its position on the matter, to wit:

We are not unaware that in some instances law enforcers resort to the practice of planting evidence to extract information or even to harass civilians. However, like alibi, frame-up is a defense that has been invariably viewed by the Court with disfavor as it can easily be concocted [and] hence commonly used as a standard line of defense in most prosecutions arising from violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. We realize the disastrous consequences on the enforcement of law and order, not to mention the well being of society, if the courts x x x accept in every instance this form of defense which can be so easily fabricated. It is precisely for this reason that the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly performed exists. x x x (G.R. No.129019, 16 August 2000).

oOo

This Court has laid down the “objective” test in scrutinizing buy-bust operations. In People v. Doria [361 Phil. 595, 621 (1999)] we said:

We therefore stress that the “objective” test in buy-bust operations demands that the details of the purported transaction must be clearly and adequately shown. This must start from the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale. The manner by which the initial contact was made, whether or not through an informant, the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the “buy-bust” money, and the delivery of the illegal drug, whether to the informant alone or the police officer, must be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense. x x x.

oOo

<!–[if !supportLists]–>(a) <!–[endif]–>The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;

oOo

<!–[if !supportLists]–>(a) <!–[endif]–>The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; Provided, further that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officers/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.

oOo

On the chain of custody of the seized drugs

The dissent agreed with accused-appellant’s assertion that the police operatives failed to comply with the proper procedure in the chain of custody of the seized drugs. It premised that non-compliance with the procedure in Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165 creates an irregularity and overcomes the presumption of regularity accorded police authorities in the performance of their official duties. This assumption is without merit.

First, it must be made clear that in several cases (citing People v. Naquita, G.R. No. 180511, 28 July 2008; People v. Concepcion, G.R. No. 178876, 27 June 2008; People v. Del Monte, G.R. No. 179940, 23 April 2008) decided by the Court, failure by the buy-bust team to comply with said section did not prevent the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty from applying.

Second, even prior to the enactment of R.A. 9165, the requirements contained in Section 21(a) were already there per Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979. Despite the presence of such regulation and its non-compliance by the buy-bust team, the Court still applied such presumption (citing People v. De los Reyes, G.R. No. 106874, 21 January 1994). We held:

The failure of the arresting police officers to comply with said DDB Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979 is a matter strictly between the Dangerous Drugs Board and the arresting officers and is totally irrelevant to the prosecution of the criminal case for the reason that the commission of the crime of illegal sale of a prohibited drug is considered consummated once the sale or transaction is established and the prosecution thereof is not undermined by the failure of the arresting officers to comply with the regulations of the Dangerous Drugs Board.

Moreover, non-compliance with the procedure outlined in Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items, for as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officers.

Consistent with this Court’s pronouncements in People v. Bano (419 SCRA 677, 15 January 2004) and in People v. Miranda (534 SCRA 552, 2 October 2007), contrary to appellant’s claim, there is no showing of a broken chain in the custody of the seized items, later on determined to be shabu, from the moment of its seizure by the entrapment team, to the investigating officer, to the time it was brought to the forensic chemist at the PNP Crime Laboratory for laboratory examination. It was duly established by documentary, testimonial, and object evidence, including the markings on the plastic sachets containing the shabu that the substance tested by the forensic chemist, whose laboratory tests were well-documented, was the same as that taken from accused-appellant.

The dissent maintains that the chain of custody rule “would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence x x x.” This means that all persons who came into contact with the seized drugs should testify in court; otherwise, the unbroken chain of custody would not be established.

We disagree. Not all people who came into contact with the seized drugs are required to testify in court. There is nothing in the New Drugs Law or in any rule implementing the same that imposes such a requirement. As long as the chain of custody of the seized substance was clearly established not to have been broken and that the prosecution did not fail to identify properly the drugs seized, it is not indispensable that each and every person who came into possession of the drugs should take the witness stand. In People v. Zeng Hua Dian (14 June 2004, G.R. No. 145348, 432 SCRA 25), we held:

After a thorough review of the records of this case, we find that the chain of custody of the seized substance was not broken and that the prosecution did not fail to identify properly the drugs seized in this case. The non-presentation of witnesses of other persons such as SPO1 Grafia, the evidence custodian, and PO3 Alamia, the officer on duty, is not a crucial point against the prosecution. The matter of presentation of witneses by the prosecution is not for the court to decide. The prosecution has the discretion as to how to present its case and it has the right to choose whom it wishes to present as witnesses.

In connection with this, it must not be forgotten that entries in official records made by a public officer in the performance of his duty are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. If it is now a requirement that all persons who came into contact with the seized drugs should testify in court, what will now happen to those public officers (e.g., person who issued request for examination of drugs or those who tested the drugs) who issued documents regarding the seized drugs? Shall they be obligated to testify despite the fact the entries in the documents they issued are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated? We do not think so. Unless there is proof to the contrary, the entries in the documents are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated and they need not testify thereon.

The dissenting opinion likewise faults the prosecution for failing to disclose the identity of the person who submitted the item that was examined. The answer to this question can easily be seen from the stamp made in the request for drug analysis. There being no question by the accused on this matter, the entry thereon made by the public officer is definitely sufficient, same being an entry in official records.

oOo

People vs. Balais, G.R. No. 173242, September 17, 2008

Alibi as a defense is often viewed with suspicion, because it is inherently weak and unreliable. For this defense to prosper, it must preclude any doubt about the physical impossibility of the presence of the accused at the locus criminis or its immediate vicinity at the time of the incident (citing People v. Navales, G.R. No. 135230, August 8, 2000, 337 SCRA 436, 449).

It is axiomatic that positive identification by the prosecution witnesses of the accused as perpetrator of the crime is entitled to greater weight than his alibi and denial (citing People v. Manegdeg, G.R. No. 115470, October 13, 1999, 316 SCRA 689, 704).

oOo

The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack, without the slightest provocation on the part of the person attacked. There is treachery when the attack on the victim was made without giving the latter warning of any kind and thus rendering him unable to defend himself from an assailant’s unexpected attack (citing People v. Ronato, G.R. No. 124298, October 11, 1999, 316 SCRA 433, 441-442).

oOo

For alevosia to qualify the crime to murder, it must be shown that:  (a) the malefactor employed such means, method or manner of execution as to ensure his or her safety from the defensive or retaliatory acts of the victim; and (b) the said means, method and manner of execution were deliberately adopted.  Treachery exists when any of the crimes against persons is committed with the employment of means, methods or forms that tend directly and specially to insure its execution, such that the offender faces no risk that may arise from the defense which the offended party might make.  The essence of treachery is the swift and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting and unarmed victim who does not give the slightest provocation (citing People v. Bermas, G.R. Nos. 76416 and 94312, July 5, 1999, 309 SCRA 741, 778).

oOo

On record, there is no showing that Balais and his companions deliberately sought nighttime and took advantage thereof to facilitate the perpetration of the crime or insure its commission (citing People v. Bato, No. L-23405, December 29, 1967, 21 SCRA 1445, 1448). By and of itself, nighttime is not an aggravating circumstance. It becomes so only when it is especially sought by the offender and taken advantage of by him to facilitate the commission of the crime to insure his immunity from capture. Stated differently, in default of any showing that the peculiar advantage of nighttime was purposely and deliberately sought by the accused, the fact that the offense was committed at night will not suffice to sustain nocturnidad. To be aggravating, this circumstance must concur with the intent or design of the offender to capitalize on the intrinsic impunity afforded by the darkness of night (citing People v. Boyles, No. L-15308, May 29, 1964, 11 SCRA 88, 94).

oOo

x x x in People v. Necerio (G.R. No. 98430, July 10, 1992, 211 SCRA 415), this Court held that nighttime should not have been considered a separate aggravating circumstance as this was absorbed by alevosia (Id. at 422).

oOo

Beyond question, the crime took place in a well-lighted area which, consequently, enabled a prosecution witness to identify Balais as one of the killers. As held by this Honorable Court in several cases, nocturnity is not aggravating where the place of the commission of the crime was well illuminated (People v. Rosario, G.R. No. 108789, July 18, 1995, 246 SCRA 658, 670-671; People v. Bato, supra).

People vs. Balinas, G.R. No. 181631, September 30, 2008

In light of the established evidence against appellant, his theory of self-defense falters. While the cardinal rule in criminal law is that the prosecution has the burden of proving the guilt of the accused, the rule is reversed where the accused admits committing the crime, but only in defense of one’s self. In interposing self-defense, appellant admits authorship of the killing and the burden of proof is shifted to him to establish that killing was justified [citing People v. Herrera, 422 Phil. 830, 850 (2001)].

oOo

The courts below correctly appreciated the circumstance of treachery. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim by the perpetrator of the crime, depriving the victim of any chance to defend himself or repel the aggression, thus insuring its commission without risk to the aggressor and without any provocation on the part of the victim [People v. Gutierrez, 426 Phil. 752, 767 (2002)].

People vs. Ballesta, G.R. No. 181632, September 25, 2008

It is settled that treachery cannot be presumed, but must be proved by clear and convincing evidence as conclusively as the killing itself. To appreciate treachery, two (2) conditions must be present, namely, (a) the employment of means of execution that give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate, and (b) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted. This Court has also previously held that where treachery is alleged, the manner of attack must be proven. Where no particulars are shown as to the manner in which the aggression was made or how the act which resulted in the death of the deceased began and developed, treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance [citing People v. Samudio, 406 Phil. 318, 329 (2001)].

oOo

In the instant case, treachery cannot be appreciated, considering that the wife and the daughter of the victim did not see the initial stage and particulars of the attack on the victim. This Court has held that where all indicia tend to support the conclusion that the attack was sudden and unexpected, but there are no precise data on this point, treachery cannot be taken into account. Treachery cannot be established from mere suppositions, drawn from the circumstances prior to the moment of the aggression, that the accused perpetrated the killing with treachery. When the witnesses did not see how the attack was carried out and cannot testify on how it began, the trial court cannot presume from the circumstances of the case that there was treachery. Circumstances which qualify criminal responsibility cannot rest on mere conjectures, no matter how reasonable or probable, but must be based on facts of unquestionable existence [citing People v. Santiago, 396 Phil. 200, 207 (2000), citing People v. Silva, 378 Phil. 1267, 1275 (1999) and People v. Lopez, 371 Phil. 852, 864 (1999)].

oOo

For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the following elements must be established: (1) the time when the accused decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act manifestly indicating that he has clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between decision and execution to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of his act [citing People v. PO3 Tan, 411 Phil. 813, 836-837 (2001)]. Like any other circumstance that qualifies a killing as murder, evident premeditation must be established by clear and positive proof; that is, by proof beyond reasonable doubt [citing People v. Manes, 362 Phil. 569, 579 (1999)]. The essence of premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act was preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment [citing People v. Rivera, 458 Phil. 856, 879 (2003)]

In this case, the prosecution failed to show the presence of any of these elements. The record is bereft of any evidence to show evident premeditation. It was not shown that the appellant and his two other co-accused, who remain at large, meditated and reflected upon their decision to kill the victim. Likewise, there is a dearth of evidence that the appellant, as well as his two co-accused, persisted in their plan to kill the victim. As this Court has repeatedly held, the premeditation to kill must be plain, notorious and sufficiently proven by evidence of outward acts showing the intent to kill [citing People v. Tan, 373 Phil. 190, 200 (1999); People v. Mahinay, 364 Phil. 423, 436 (1999); People v. Chua, 357 Phil. 907, 921 (1998)]. In the absence of clear and positive evidence, mere presumptions and inferences of evident premeditation, no matter how logical and probable, are insufficient (People v. Tan, id.)

oOo

The qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength cannot also be appreciated. This aggravating circumstance is present when the aggressors purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked [citing People v. Garcia, 435 Phil. 283, 295 (2002)]. In this case, however, the prosecution failed to prove that the appellant purposely used an excessive force in attacking the victim, considering that the prosecution witnesses did not actually see how the victim was shot.

oOo

Lacking sufficient evidence of conspiracy and there being doubt as to whether appellant acted as a principal or just a mere accomplice, the doubt should be resolved in his favor and is thus held liable only as an accomplice (citing People v. Santiago, supra note 32 at 211-212).

oOo

The failure of the prosecution to prove the existence of conspiracy does not eliminate any criminal liability on the part of the appellant. Although he cannot be convicted as a co-principal by reason of the conspiracy, he can still be liable as an accomplice. Where the quantum of proof required to establish conspiracy is lacking, the doubt created as to whether the appellant acted as principal or as accomplice will always be resolved in favor of the milder form of criminal liability – that of a mere accomplice (citing People v. Samudio, supra, at 333). Thus, it is only proper to hold the appellant guilty as an accomplice of the crime of homicide.

People vs. Barriga, et al., G.R. No. 178545, September 29, 2008

The essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act is preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent within a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment [citing People v. Uganap, et al., 411 Phil. 320, 335 (2001); citing People v. Bibat, 290 SCRA 27 (1998). See also People v. Reyes, 350 Phil. 683, 696, 697 (1998); People v. Galvez, 407 Phil. 541, 560 (2001), citing People v. Orculla, G.R. No. 132350, 5 July 2000, 335 SCRA 129. See also People v. Torres, Jr. 400 Phil. 1332, 1347 (2000); People v. Sgt. Magno, 379 Phil. 537, 555 (2000); People v. Tan, 373 Phil. 190 (1999); People v. Silvestre, 366 Phil. 527 (1999); People v. Gatchalian, 360 Phil. 178 (1998); People v. Villamor, 354 Phil. 396 )1998); People v. Timblor, 348 Phil. 847 (1998)].

oOo

The Court of Appeals correctly held that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not clearly established since none of the witnesses saw how the shooting was started. For treachery to be appreciated, it must be present and seen by the witness right at the inception of the attack [citing People v. Leal, 411 Phil. 465, 479 (2001), citing People v. Sambulan, G.R. No. 112972, 24 April 1998, 289 SCRA 500, 515; People v. Amanmangpang, 291 SCRA 638, 653, July 2, 1998; People v. Bautista, 312 SCRA 214, 235, August 11, 1999; People v. Sioc, Jr., 319 SCRA 12, 22, November 24, 1999; People v. Maldo, 307 SCRA 424, 440-441, May 19, 1999. See also People v. Bahenting, 363 Phil. 181, 191 (1999). See also People v. Mantung, 369 Phil. 1085, 1101 (1999); People v. Borreros, 366 Phil. 360, 373-374 (1999)]. Where no particulars are known as to how the killing began, its perpetration with treachery cannot merely be supposed (citing People v. Leal, supra, citing People v. Borreros, 306 SCRA 680, 693, May 5, 1999; People v. Silvestre, 307 SCRA 68; 89-90, May 12, 1999).

oOo

The rule is that when more than one qualifying circumstances is proven, the others must be considered as generic aggravating [citing People v. Reynes, 423 Phil. 363, 384 (2001), citing People v. Danico, 208 SCRA 472 (1992)].

_______________________________________

People vs. Puig, et al., G.R. No. 173654-765, August 28, 2008

Qualified theft; elements

Qualified Theft, as defined and punished under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, is committed as follows, viz:

ART. 310.  Qualified Theft.  – The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding article, if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation, fish taken from a fishpond or fishery or if property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance. (Emphasis supplied.)

Theft, as defined in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, requires the physical taking of another’s property without violence or intimidation against persons or force upon things. The elements of the crime under this Article are:

1.      Intent to gain;

2.      Unlawful taking;

3.      Personal property belonging to another;

4.      Absence of violence or intimidation against persons or force upon things.

To fall under the crime of Qualified Theft, the following elements must concur:

1.      Taking of personal property;

2.      That the said property belongs to another;

3.      That the said taking be done with intent to gain;

4.      That it be done without the owner’s consent;

5.     That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things;

6.      That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.

oOo

It is beyond doubt that tellers, Cashiers, Bookkeepers and other employees of a Bank who come into possession of the monies deposited therein enjoy the confidence reposed in them by their employer. Banks, on the other hand, where monies are deposited, are considered the owners thereof. This is very clear not only from the express provisions of the law, but from established jurisprudence. The relationship between banks and depositors has been held to be that of creditor and debtor. Articles 1953 and 1980 of the New Civil Code, as appropriately pointed out by petitioner, provide as follows:

Article 1953. A person who receives a loan of money or any other fungible thing acquires the ownership thereof, and is bound to pay to the creditor an equal amount of the same kind and quality.

Article 1980. Fixed, savings, and current deposits of money in banks and similar institutions shall be governed by the provisions concerning loan.

In a long line of cases involving Qualified Theft, this Court has firmly established the nature of possession by the Bank of the money deposits therein, and the duties being performed by its employees who have custody of the money or have come into possession of it. The Court has consistently considered the allegations in the Information that such employees acted with grave abuse of confidence, to the damage and prejudice of the Bank, without particularly referring to it as owner of the money deposits, as sufficient to make out a case of Qualified Theft. For a graphic illustration, we cite Roque v. People (G.R. No. 138954, 25 November 2004, 444 SCRA 98, 100-101) where the accused teller was convicted for Qualified Theft based on this Information:

That on or about the 16th day of November, 1989, in the municipality  of Floridablanca, province of Pampanga, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of his Honorable Court, the above-named accused ASUNCION GALANG ROQUE,  being then employed as teller of the Basa Air Base Savings and Loan Association Inc. (BABSLA) with office address at Basa Air Base, Floridablanca, Pampanga, and as such was authorized and reposed with the responsibility to receive and collect capital contributions from its member/contributors of said corporation, and having collected and received in her capacity as teller of the BABSLA the sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00), said accused, with intent of gain, with grave abuse of confidence and without the knowledge and consent of said corporation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away the amount of P10,000.00, Philippine currency, by making it appear that a certain depositor by the name of Antonio Salazar withdrew from his Savings Account No. 1359, when in truth and in fact said Antonio Salazar did not withdr[a]w the said amount of P10,000.00 to the damage and prejudice of BABSLA in the total amount of P10,000.00, Philippine currency.

In convicting the therein appellant, the Court held that:

[S]ince the teller occupies a position of confidence, and the bank places money in the teller’s possession due to the confidence reposed on the teller, the felony of qualified theft would be committed (Id. at 119).

Also in People v. Sison [citing 379 Phil. 363, 366-367 (2000)] the Branch Operations Officer was convicted of the crime of Qualified Theft based on the Information as herein cited:

That in or about and during the period compressed between January 24, 1992 and February 13, 1992, both dates inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, take, steal and carry away the following, to wit:

Cash money amounting to P6,000,000.00 in different denominations belonging to the PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK (PCIBank for brevity), Luneta Branch, Manila represented by its Branch Manager, HELEN U. FARGAS, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the aforesaid amount of P6,000,000.00, Philippine Currency.

That in the commission of the said offense, herein accused acted with grave abuse of confidence and unfaithfulness, he being the Branch Operation Officer of the said complainant and as such he had free access to the place where the said amount of money was kept.

x x x

From another end, People v. Locson [(57 Phil. 325 (1932)] in addition to People v. Sison, described the nature of possession by the Bank. The money in this case was in the possession of the defendant as receiving teller of the bank, and the possession of the defendant was the possession of the Bank. The Court held therein that when the defendant, with grave abuse of confidence, removed the money and appropriated it to his own use without the consent of the Bank, there was taking as contemplated in the crime of Qualified Theft (Id.)

Tarapen vs. People, G.R. No. 173824, August 28, 2008

Our case law is unequivocal in saying that the testimony of a witness prevails over an affidavit. In short, affidavits are generally subordinated in importance to open-court declarations; or, more bluntly stated, whenever there is inconsistency between an affidavit and the testimony of a witness in court, the testimony commands greater weight [citing People v. Ortiz, 413 Phil. 592, 611 (2001)]. The Court has consistently ruled that the alleged inconsistencies between the testimony of a witness in open court and his sworn statement before the investigators are not fatal defects that would justify the reversal of a judgment of conviction (citing People v. Sorila, Jr., G.R. No. 178540, 27 June 2008).

oOo

By actual practice, only government physicians, by virtue of their oaths as civil service officials, are competent to examine persons and issue medical certificates which will be used by the government (citing People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144332, 10 June 2004, 431 SCRA 610, 621). As such, the medical certificate carries the presumption of regularity in the performance of his functions and duties. Moreover, under Section 44, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court, entries in official records made in the performance of official duty are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. x x x an unverified medical certificate not issued by a government physician is unreliable (Id.).

oOo

Having admitted that he killed James, the burden of evidence that one acted in self-defense shifted to petitioner. Like an alibi, self-defense is inherently weak, for it is easy to fabricate (citing People v. Beltran, Jr., G.R. No. 168051, 27 September 2006, 503 SCRA 715, 735). It is textbook doctrine that when self-defense is invoked, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused to show that the killing was justified, and that he incurred no criminal liability therefor. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution’s evidence, for, even if the latter were weak, it could not be disbelieved after his open admission of responsibility for the killing. Hence, he must prove the essential requisites of self-defense as aforementioned (citing Sanchez v. People, G.R. No. 161007, 6 December 2006, 510 SCRA 365, 369).

oOo

Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of self-defense, whether complete or incomplete (citing Toledo v. People, G.R. No. 158057, 24 September 2004, 439 SCRA 94, 109). Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack, or imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude [citing People v. Cario, 351 Phil. 644, 659 (1998)]. There must be actual physical force or a threat to inflict physical injury. In case of a threat, it must be offensive and positively strong so as to display a real, not imagined, intent to cause injury (citing Martinez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 168827, 13 April 2007, 521 SCRA 176, 195).

___________________________________

People vs. Dumlao, G.R. No. 181599, August 20, 2008

Sale of dangerous drugs; elements

What determines if there was, indeed, a sale of dangerous drugs is proof of the concurrence of all the elements of the offense; to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor, which the prosecution has satisfactorily established. The prosecution satisfactorily proved the illegal sale of dangerous drugs and presented in court evidence of corpus delicti (citing People v. Nicolas, G.R. No. 170234, February 8, 2007, 515 SCRA 187, 197-198).

oOo

Presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty

In cases involving violations of Dangerous Drugs Act, credence should be given to the narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses especially when they are police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there be evidence to the contrary. Moreover, in the absence of proof of motive to falsely impute such a serious crime against the appellant, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, shall prevail over petitioner’s self-serving and uncorroborated denial (citing Dimacuha v. People, G.R. No. 143705, February 23, 2007, 516 SCRA 513, 522-523).

People vs. Flora, et al., G. R. No. 181594, August 28, 2008

Special complex crime of robbery with homicide

In criminal law, it is settled that when the killing is admitted and self-defense is invoked, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused to show that the result (killing) was legally justified. Otherwise stated, the accused assumes the burden to establish his plea by credible, clear and convincing evidence; otherwise, conviction would follow from his admission that he killed the victim [citing People v. Tagana, 468 Phil. 784, 800-801 (2004)]. In the case at bar, having owned up to the killing of the victim, the accused should be able to prove the elements of self-defense in order to avail himself of this justifying circumstance; and he must discharge this burden by clear and convincing evidence.

oOo

Self-defense

For self-defense to be appreciated, it is required that there be: (1) an unlawful aggression by the victim injured or killed by the accused; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel that unlawful aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. And all the foregoing conditions must concur [citing People v. Tagana, 468 Phil. 801 (2004)].

Herein, the RTC and the Court of Appeals were both correct when they held that the justifying circumstance of self-defense was baselessly invoked by appellant Rolly. The latter failed to discharge the burden of proving this justifiable circumstance. His claim that the victim initiated the fracas with his unlawful act of trying to stab the former is specious at best. Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden and unexpected or imminent danger on the life and limb of a person – a mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not sufficient (citing Martinez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 168827, 13 April 2007, 521 SCRA 176, 194-195. But whether or not Rolly, indeed, acted in self-defense is a question of fact (citing People v. De los Reyes, G.R. No. 140680, 28 May 2004, 430 SCRA 166, 173; Senoja v. People, G.R. No. 160341, 19 October 2004, 440 SCRA 695, 706). The well-entrenched rule is that the findings of fact of the trial court in the ascertainment of the credibility of witnesses and the probative weight of the evidence on record affirmed, on appeal, by the appellate court are accorded high respect, if not conclusive effect, by the Court; and in the absence of any justifiable reason to deviate from the said findings [citing Rugas v. People, 464 Phil. 493, 504 (2004)].

oOo

Special complex crime of robbery with homicide; elements

To warrant the conviction of appellants for said charge, the prosecution was burdened to prove the confluence of the following essential elements:

(a) the taking of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against a person;

<!–[if !supportLists]–>(b) <!–[endif]–>the property thus taken belongs to another;

<!–[if !supportLists]–>(c) <!–[endif]–>the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and

<!–[if !supportLists]–>(d) <!–[endif]–>on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide, which is therein used in a generic sense, was committed [(citing People v. Gamo, 351 Phil. 944, 953-954 (1998)].

oOo

Well-settled is the legal principle that a categorical and positive identification of an accused, without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial (citing People v. Suarez, G.R. Nos. 153573-76, 15 April 2005, 456 SCRA 349).